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“But didn’t he kill 
his wife?”
If there is one thing that everyone knows 
about Louis Althusser, it is that he killed 
his wife - the sociologist and résistante 
Hélène Rytmann-Légotien. In this article, 
William S. Lewis asks how should this fact 
eﬀect the reception of Althusser's work, 
and how should those who find 
Althusser's reconceptualisation of Marx 
and Marxism usefully respond? 
There is a common reaction when people find out 
that the work of Louis Althusser significantly 
informs your thinking.[1] If the person knows who 
Althusser is–and especially if the acquaintance 
identifies as female–you will often be met with a 
stunned silence, followed by: “But didn’t he kill his 
wife?” How to respond?  The banal and facile reply 
is: “Yes, but this fact doesn’t matter 
philosophically.” However, given the frequency of 
this and similar reactions, to say that the killing 
does not matter at all is plainly wrong. For those of 
us who find Althusser’s rethinking of Marxism of 
theoretical or practical relevance, a pressing moral 
and political question is, therefore, how can we 
continue to think with Althusser. Can we continue 
to employ Althusser’s philosophical ideas 
politically in light of this oﬀense? 
The ways in which theorists and activists have 
typically dealt with the uncomfortable fact that 
Althusser ended the life of his wife, the sociologist 
and résistante Hélène Rytmann-Légotien, have 
undoubtedly hindered the reception of Althusser’s 
ideas.[2] Two years ago and in preparation for a 
conference supporting Althusser’s 2018 centenary, 
I prepared a list of every philosopher, political 
theorist, or social scientist whose work was 
significantly informed by Althusser’s ideas. The 
male to female ratio of the list was somewhere 
around11/1, making Althusser studies worse in 
terms of gender equity than academic philosophy 
as a whole, and probably much worse than political 
philosophy as a sub-discipline.[3] That Marxism, 
socialism, and the far left have their own gender 
problems presents confounding variables. But, 
having researched Althusser for over twenty years 
and having corresponded or visited with folks 
interested in Althusser from all over the world, I 
am only too aware that the Althusser-citing crowd 
overwhelmingly identifies as male. Further, more 
than one student has told me of graduate seminar 
debates regarding whether one should teach, read, 
or cite Althusser given his history. Clearly, we have 
evidence to suggest that the fact of Althusser 
killing his wife is generally oﬀ-putting, perhaps 
particularly to women, who might otherwise be 
interested in his thought. During the year 
following Althusser’s centenary, when his life is 
temporally connected to his work and to its 
ongoing influence, it is more than appropriate to 
think about the relation of his biography to his 
ideas and to the history of their reception.[4]
If one made two stacks of the literature written 
about Althusser, the mound that puts the killing of 
Rytmann-Légotien front and center–what I will 
call the externalist or biographical approach–
would far outweigh the pile that exclusively treats 
of Althusser’s contributions to political 
philosophy. That said, the latter–philosophy first 
or internalist approach–is the one that I have taken 
for most of my career. I then want to examine the 
arguments for and against it first.[5] The externalist 
approach takes two forms: one from those 
interested in the history of philosophy, and 
another to those in political philosophy. History of 
philosophy types consider Althusser’s work in its 
historical context and look to understand how it 
contributed to contemporaneous theoretical 
debates–biographical claims only enter when they 
help to explain things like formation, or the eﬀect 
of these on the work’s production or reception. 
Political philosophers or theorists, by way of 
contrast, tend to elaborate, reconstruct, criticize, 
apply, or reject the arguments and concepts that he 
developed in political philosophy in order to solve 
philosophical or political problems. Therefore, 
they give even less attention to his biography than 
do those in history of philosophy.
Despite diﬀerences in focus and methodology, the 
arguments for treating Althusser exclusively as a 
political philosopher are basically identical for 
history of philosophy and for contemporary 
political philosophy. The first argument is very 
rough and may be contestable given the definition 
of philosophy it includes. From the standpoint of 
history, it is that the history of philosophy consists 
of a history of ideas about ourselves, our universe, 
and about our place within it. Philosophy in this 
definition is about finding the truth of things or, 
better put, about developing concepts adequate to 
the conceptualization of the universe that we 
inhabit and about deciding how we should live in 
it. Correspondingly, political philosophy is about 
creating, analyzing, and defending adequate or 
true ideas about how we should live with others. 
Combining the former and the latter, history of 
political philosophy surveys, critiques, or applies 
ideas from the past regarding how we should live 
together and about who has legitimate power over 
others. For both, and regardless of whether we are 
doing straight political philosophy or history of 
political philosophy, it is the ideas and arguments 
that matter and–as with the development of other 
sciences–the biography of the thinker of the ideas 
and arguments is irrelevant to the utility, 
adequacy, or truth value produced by this practice.
The second argument for treating Althusser 
exclusively as a political philosopher, rather than 
just implying a duty to treat ideas in the abstract as 
the first, fleshes out why it matters that ideas are 
tied to a specific person. Brian Leiter makes the 
case for such reference succinctly in a recent essay 
for the Chronicle of Higher Education titled: 
“Academic Ethics: Should Scholars Avoid Citing 
the Work of Awful People?”[6] There, he argues that 
scholarship is about advancing knowledge within a 
discipline and that, within a discipline, scholarly 
citation has only two purposes. These are “to 
acknowledge a prior contribution to knowledge on 
which your work depends” and “to serve as an 
epistemic authority for a claim relevant to your 
own contribution to knowledge.” According to 
Leiter, failure to cite relevant knowledge is harmful 
because scholarship is thereby not advanced. 
Therefore, if an idea or argument is relevant to 
one’s scholarship, then our duty as scholars is to 
cite it and to name the originator of that 
knowledge.
Combined, the first and second arguments suggest 
that not only must we do philosophy by reference 
to past ideas–even if awful people originate these 
notions–but also that we have a duty to explicitly 
reference these people. Notice, however, that these 
two arguments do not imply that we have a duty to 
skip over the wrongful deeds and characters of the 
originators of philosophical concepts; merely that 
any such mention is extraneous to the purpose of 
scholarship, which is to advance knowledge on a 
specific topic in a specific discipline.
As mentioned above, I have embraced the 
internalist or philosophy-first approach. Though I 
had never worked it out as clearly as I just did, I 
believe these arguments have merit and that 
philosophy would be irremediably harmed if we 
were to expunge the ideas of vicious philosophers. 
Rousseau and Peirce would have to be thrown in 
the dustbin and that is to name only two thinkers 
who treated others horribly.[7] Yet, I must also 
confess another–more practical and less 
principled–motive. This purpose was to get 
Althusser’s ideas accepted and discussed within 
Anglophone analytic political philosophy. In this 
tradition, it is the norm to discuss ideas 
irrespective of the context of their production. So, 
to slip a French, Marxist, murderer into 
conversation with John Rawls and Iris Marion 
Young, there was an all too convenient disciplinary 
norm where all three strikes against his ideas being 
entertained in the Anglosphere could be ignored; 
one could just focus on “advancing political 
philosophy.”
Strategically convenient, yes, but the response 
obviously flees from the question this essay poses: 
that of whether and how to employ Althusser’s 
ideas in light of his killing of Rytmann-Légotien. In 
order to answer this question, we should seek a 
better understanding of what harms are associated 
with both the externalist and the internalist 
methods.
The approach outlined so far, which puts the 
content of the philosophy first, has three central 
problems. First, internalism ignores the direct 
interpersonal harms caused by Althusser’s oﬀense. 
Second, not only it is oblivious to the impersonal 
harm to the discipline of philosophy such 
ignorance may precipitate. It also ignores the 
damage to Marxist practice that occurs when 
people who may otherwise advance Marxist 
philosophy or practice are turned oﬀ by the fact 
that leftists discuss the ideas of vicious people in 
the same way that we discuss the ideas of virtuous 
ones. Third, and particularly apposite to the 
subject of this essay, the philosophy first approach 
disregards the impersonal harms to society when 
we do not hold someone accountable for his or her 
crimes. Althusser was judged non culpable and let 
oﬀ for the homicide due to his being mentally 
unstable at the time the killing was committed.[8] 
More than a few critics have argued that 
patriarchal dominance and structural misogyny 
were the reasons for this verdict, that the victim 
herself was silenced (while Althusser kept on 
speaking) and that to continue to read Althusser is 
to contribute to women’s ongoing oppression.[9]
Of these three problems with the philosophy first 
approach, it is the impersonal wrongs–being 
widespread and persistent––that perhaps most 
deserve our consideration. As for direct harms, the 
person Althusser maltreated is deceased and so 
cannot be harmed any further. That those close to 
Rytmann-Légotien were directly robbed of her care 
and friendship is also true. However, lacking 
children and being born in 1910, the number of 
people who knew her is small. If, there are friends 
and relations of Rytmann-Légotien still hurting 
because the killer of a loved one is discussed while 
his victim is forgotten, then this is a type of direct 
harm, albeit limited in scope and becoming daily 
more restricted. As for the wrong of profiting from 
ones notoriety, Althusser is dead and so he cannot 
be said to directly benefit in prestige or lucre from 
the harm he committed when one reads, discusses, 
or cites his work. Richard Seymour suggests that 
there is another source of direct injury in that, by 
shortening Rytmann-Légotien’s life, we all lose the 
benefit of hearing her ideas.[10] Temporally, this is, 
indeed, a permanent loss. However, Rytmann-
Légotien published and lectured little in her 
lifetime and there is no indication that, at the age 
of 70, her public career was about to accelerate.[11] 
Plus, and noted with shameful irony, it is almost 
certain that we know as much as we do of 
Rytmann-Légotien’s life and ideas precisely 
because Althusser killed her and wrote a book 
about the murder. Without the autobiography and 
its sales figures, the couple’s correspondence 
would most probably never have been published.
[12] Further, it is indubitable that the success of the 
autobiography led to articles and investigations 
into the life and work of Rytmann-Légotien, 
studies which would not otherwise have been 
undertaken.[13]
In contrast to the direct harms, that, while serious, 
are limited in scope or time, the impersonal harms 
associated with ignoring the killing of Rytmann-
Légotien and simply reading and using Althusser 
for his ideas are both persistent and grave. First 
among them, we should consider the injury to the 
discipline of philosophy and to political 
movements done by alienating those who might 
otherwise be interested in Althusser’s thinking but 
who are put oﬀ by scholars’ and activists’ easy 
embrace of the internalist approach. Similarly, 
there is much to be said on behalf of the argument 
that failing to punish violence against women and 
continuing to ignore female victims of male 
violence by not discussing past harms reinforces 
patriarchy and contributes to women’s ongoing 
oppression. Ignoring a victim of male violence who 
can no longer speak for herself as a result of that 
violence is perhaps the most egregious form of 
“testimonial smothering.”[14] This silencing is 
compounded when theorists and activists seek to 
limit discussions to ideas and arguments and to 
bracket past misogynistic oﬀenses as unrelated to 
present egalitarian political strategies and 
struggles. The recent Brett Kavanaugh Supreme 
Court confirmation hearing in the United States 
Senate, where senators and pundits demanded 
that the yet-to-be appointed Justice be scrutinized 
only for his jurisprudential record, should be 
exhibit “A” in this regard.[15]
Consequently, if there be plausible impersonal 
harms to the discipline of philosophy, to women, 
and to an egalitarian future by ignoring the 
inconvenient facts of Althusser’s biography, then it 
would seem that the externalist or biographical 
approach to Althusser’s philosophy has merit. This 
is because those who consider Althusser’s 
philosophy in relation to his life and his life in 
relation to his philosophy cannot be considered to 
have similarly ignored the female victim of male 
violence while celebrating the male’s 
achievements. Moreover, rather than alienation by 
omission, externalist accounts invite those 
potentially interested in Althusser’s philosophy to 
think of him as a whole person, embedded in 
history, who had severe mental health problems, 
who manifested both virtues and vices, but who 
also had interesting ideas about ideology, 
causality, and class struggle.
As mentioned above, the scholarship on Althusser 
that takes the externalist approach is voluminous. 
Can one name another 20th century political 
philosopher who has had multiple volumes written 
about their inner life and television and radio 
documentaries similarly devoted?[16] For that 
matter, name another thinker who has had 
multiple dramatic pieces mounted exploring their 
dreams and their inner monologues.[17] And these 
are just the large pieces: there exist dozens of op-
eds, essays in literary reviews, and book chapters 
relating Althusser’s philosophy to the internal and 
external events of his life. Given the sheer amount 
of material, we may use this body of work to 
determine whether the biographical approach may 
plausibly diminish the harms associated with the 
philosophy first approach.
To aid us in this assessment, we might think a bit 
with the philosopher under consideration. 
Famously, Althusser maintained that the truth of a 
philosophy is in its eﬀects.[18] If all of the pieces 
that attempt to understand Althusser’s philosophy 
by his biography are themselves a type of 
externalist philosophy, then at this point in the 
game, their eﬀect is quite noticeable. However, and 
again to follow with Althusser’s ideas about 
overdetermination and uneven development, the 
eﬀects of philosophical ideas are not always and 
everywhere the same and they do not happen at 
the same time.[19] In diﬀerent countries, at 
diﬀerent periods, externalist approaches have had 
diﬀerent results.
In France, the obsession with Althusser’s 
biography and especially with psychoanalytic 
explanations of his behavior and ideas has largely 
occluded these ideas’ philosophical consideration. 
As a once prominent intellectual and Marxist, 
Althusser is not alone in this occlusion: lingering 
romantic obsessions with madness and genius as 
well as French anti-communism have 
overdetermined the production and reception of 
externalist work. The result is that Althusser has 
been reduced to a caricature: the mad Marxist 
philosopher whom history passed by and who 
remains only of pathological, nostalgic, or 
dramatic interest. The result of this is an industry–
the Althusser industry–where plays, 
documentaries, and staged readings compete with 
texts of dream narratives and personal letters for 
notices in Le Monde littéraire.[20] The most recent 
and perhaps most egregious in this regard was 
France Culture’s “La vie secrète des philosophes : 
Le procès Althusser” which dwelt almost wholly on 
murder and pathology and only tangentially on his 
importance as a philosopher.[21]
Unlike Greece, Turkey, Japan, Germany, Italy, and 
much of North and South America where the level 
of scholarship on Althusser is fairly high (and 
everywhere mostly male), this obsession with the 
past has stunted Althusser studies within the 
country of his birth. In France, Althusser 
scholarship seems stuck in 1978 and the same texts: 
the ISA essay, For Marx, Reading Capital, and the 
published “Philosophy of the Encounter” texts are 
discussed ad nauseum. Too often these works are 
read sloppily, subjected to “immanent” or 
“psychoanalytic” critique or supplemented with 
inaccurate accounts of the theoretical, political, or 
biographical conjuncture that produced them. It is 
as if Althusser’s ideas were hermetically sealed on 
the eve of Mitterand’s election. There are 
exceptions to this quarantine, but these pieces and 
their authors are the exception and not the rule.[22]
In Anglophone countries, but particularly in the 
United Kingdom, the level of theoretical 
engagement outside of specialist circles has been 
even lower.[23] While novel interpretations and 
usages of Althusser’s thought flourished among 
Analytic Marxists, Critical Realists, and Neo-
Marxists in the 1970s and 1980s, these research 
programs declined with Cold War budgets. Now, 
the most prominent English-language voices that 
“deal with” Althusser are writers and historians 
like Anne Boyer, Sunil Khilnani, and Tony Judt. In 
essays like “The Paris Strangler,” such critics have 
constructed a faulty syllogism that functions as an 
ad hominem attack on Marxism.[24] It goes 
something like this:
• Althusser killed his wife.
• Killing is Bad.
• Althusser was communist and Marxist.
• Communists also killed people
• .: Marxism and communism are bad.
When these scholars do a little research, they read 
so far as Althusser’s autobiography and there 
discover self-incrimination: astonishingly, the 
most celebrated post-war Marxist philosopher 
declares in The Future Lasts Forever that he did 
not even read Marx![25] These writers never bother 
to check the archives to see Althusser’s meticulous 
notes. Neither do they bother reading any 
contemporary scholarship, research that makes a 
strong case for the continuing relevance of his 
political philosophy. Unlike in France where the 
externalist approach has ossified Althusser’s 
reception, in the case of Anglophone externalists, 
the biographical approach has rendered his 
philosophy invisible, if not anathema.
Of course, part of the problem with both the 
Anglophone and Francophone externalist 
approaches to Althusser’s philosophy is that the 
biographical methods employed are reductivist 
and facile. The former is animated by anti-
communism and anti-intellectualism. The latter 
stems from fascination with intellectual celebrity, 
armchair psychoanalysis, and notoriety. These 
deficiencies mean that we must suppose a 
methodologically rigorous biographical account in 
order to test if externalist accounts avoid the harms 
associated with externalism. Thorough 
biographical work would take seriously the fact 
Althusser was a product of his times and that he 
also contributed to them. They would look at the 
totality of available archival documents that relate 
his biography to his philosophy and–in order to 
give the best possible exposition of this 
philosophy–they would consider the relevant 
internalist research. Finally, such accounts would 
distinguish as best they can between a mentally 
well Althusser and one suﬀering from mental 
health issues, giving primacy to the former when 
his philosophical ideas are discussed and 
elaborated.
Such methodological rigor would, no doubt, give 
us a much better idea of how Althusser’s ideas are 
the product of a socially and historically embedded 
life. But would they solve the problems noted 
above as well as have the advantages that the 
internalist account oﬀers for the due philosophical 
consideration of Althusser’s ideas? That is, would 
they or could they: (a) attract those who might be 
interested in Althusser’s ideas but who are 
alienated by internalist approaches that do not 
acknowledge the killing; (b) work against the 
existing narrative that silences female victims and 
thereby contributes to women’s ongoing 
oppression; (c) adequately consider his work in its 
historical context as to how it contributed into 
debates of the time and shaped these debates such 
that his contributions to the history of Marxism 
and political philosophy be recognized; and (d) 
elaborate, reconstruct, criticize, and apply the 
arguments and concepts that he developed such 
that philosophers, activists, and political 
strategists can make use of them?
If we set to one side questions of format and 
disciplinary norms such as those within 
Anglophone analytic philosophy, and further, if we 
suppose that authoring and publishing rigorous 
externalist accounts is possible, then my rough 
answer to these questions is that methodologically 
exacting externalist accounts could fulfill some of 
these desiderata but not others. Clearly, the 
condition that Althusser’s work be considered in 
its historical context could be met. More 
specifically, sensitively written pieces that take the 
facts of Althusser’s biography seriously may invite 
into the theoretical and practical conversation 
those put oﬀ by existing accounts. In their 
obsession with the homicide, current externalist 
work ends up making this one act the truth of 
Althusser’s philosophy. It thereby replicates some 
of the impersonal harms catalogued above and 
compounds most of the direct ones. While a 
relationship between the murder and his thought 
may be uncovered, it is unquestionably true that 
Althusser’s philosophy, the killing, his victim’s 
status, the police response, and the French court’s 
verdict were overdetermined by the masculine 
dominated, social institutions and practices which 
formed, employed, and, eventually, judged him. 
The same true is for Althusser’s posthumous 
reception. Thoroughgoing externalist approaches 
could elucidate these causal relations. Rigorous 
biographical approaches may also overcome the 
distantiation eﬀect that externalist accounts 
trigger as they do not ask the reader to dismiss the 
killing and to focus exclusively on Althusser’s ideas 
and arguments. Further, in well-done externalist 
scholarship, Rytmann-Légotien would be given a 
voice and a history. Thereby, the tragedy of her 
demise would be felt and recognized 
independently of Althusser’s and post-war 
Marxism’s demise, two events under which it is 
facilely and all too frequently subsumed.
Despite these benefits, the principal problem with 
rigorous externalist accounts is that, inevitably, the 
philosophy gets muddled with the history. The 
irony to Althusser’s reception is that he worked 
diligently to extract and clarify Marxian 
philosophical concepts for the use of egalitarian 
political movements yet the facts of his life and his 
autobiography serve to occlude these notions from 
the circumstances for which they were intended.
[26] A perhaps deeper irony is some of this work is 
not only deeply and presciently feminist but that 
feminist theorists have made interesting and 
productive use of Althusser’s ideas.[27] Sometimes, 
as with Laura Mulvey’s work on the visual pleasure 
and Judith Butler’s on gender, these applications 
have changed the direction of entire academic 
disciplines.[28]
Simply put, for philosophy and for political 
practice, there are certain times when we need to 
interrogate the assumptions and notions that 
undergird our analyses and our practices and there 
are other times when we simply need to focus on 
the construction of new strategies and concepts. 
Yes, Althusser probably would not have become a 
communist were he not imprisoned in a Stalag or if 
he never met Rytmann-Légotien. However, the 
adequacy and utility of his idea of communism as 
mutual relations of amity and respect under 
condition of non-domination and non-exploitation 
can and sometimes need to be debated 
independently of these facts.[29] Linking biography 
with philosophy as intellectual historians often do 
tends to causally reduce the latter to the former. 
Internalist approaches, by way of contrast, allow us 
to elaborate, reconstruct, criticize, and apply the 
arguments and concepts Althusser developed in 
their autonomy. They then become tools whose 
usefulness to the movement can be assessed, 
applied, and then independently verified in terms 
of their helpfulness to philosophers, activists, and 
political strategists.
Fortunately, we are not stuck with a choice 
between philosophy first and biographical 
approaches to Althusser’s political theory. There 
are publishing venues and discussion 
opportunities for both. Due to the horrific political 
conjuncture we now collectively face, these fora 
are multiplying. Both methods therefore can 
proliferate and both are useful; we can have 
internalist accounts which advance political theory 
and political strategy and we can produce 
sophisticated externalist accounts which do the 
same but which simultaneously redress the harms 
done by ignoring Rytmann-Légotien’s death. 
Further, by incorporating mention of the 
uxoricide, internalist accounts can reduce the 
impersonal harms to women, left theory, and left 
strategy that caused by ignoring it. Yes, inasmuch 
as Althusser advanced political philosophy and 
philosophy is about ideas, those concerned with 
refuting or reconstructing his ideas have a duty to 
cite him. However, we do not have to do so 
unreflectively. In time, by incorporating these 
changes, the damages to political philosophy and 
to left political movements by treating Althusser 
like any other philosopher might be reduced. 
Similarly, if these paths are pursued, it could no 
longer be said that those who study or use 
Althusser’s ideas continue to ignore past and 
present female victims of male violence. 
How though to address the challenge of the 
colleague or student who is potentially interested 
in Marxian political theory but who meets the 
seminar assignment of “Contradiction and 
Overdetermination” with stunned silence or even 
with protest? What then, to do, when an activist 
calls out a comrade for using the concepts of ISA 
and RSA to explain racial disparities in sentencing 
and arrests? Will the combination and proliferation 
of rigorous externalist methods help here? I think 
that it might, but only to a small extent. There will 
be some trickle-down as the scholarship improves 
and, perhaps, rebarbative or hostile receptions will 
become less frequent. However, the real work is 
and will only be accomplished when those of us 
who do find Althusser of theoretical and practical 
interest begin to take these moments seriously. 
Taking these moments in earnest means that we 
pause and that we listen to comrades, colleagues, 
and students when they express apprehension or 
reprobation about employing Althusser’s ideas. 
After listening, we may dialogue together about the 
right way to proceed. Yes, concepts like Ideological 
State Apparatus, problematic, and 
overdetermination are theoretically and politically 
useful. However, no one will be engaged with 
Althusserian ideas if they are stuck wondering why 
someone would teach, research, or apply the 
thoughts of a man who killed his wife.
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